Derek Marshall was at the launch of "Britain's Generals in Blair's Wars" (published by Ashgate) at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The hall was packed with a distinguished audience, including CDS General Sir David Richards, former MoD permanent Secretary Sir Kevin Tebbitt and many other MOD/military notables. The speakers were Professor Sir Hew Strachan, one of the editors, soon-to-be Commander, Land Forces General Sir Nick Parker and Desmond Bowen, formerly of MoD and Cabinet Office. The overall sense I had, although the tone was patient and polite, was of the pent up unease of the military about the wars they had been thrust into by Blair without adequate planning and resource.

By Guy Birks

After the fall of the Soviet Union the large-scale decommissioning and scrapping of heavy armoured units, carried out by the Russian Federation, symbolised the end of a reliance on heavy armour capabilities. It also represented the cessation of a theoretical and practical era based on planning scenarios centred on large-scale tank formations fighting on the plains of Germany. A conventional focus on plans for armoured encounter in Europe shaped and defined the dominant approach of both NATO forces and the Soviet Union to land warfare. The core tactical asset of this approach was the most powerful and versatile armoured weapon – the tank. For many analysts however, the decline of planning scenarios based on tank-on-tank engagement in Europe represents the beginning of the end of the declining utility of tanks as a tactical asset.